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Work - its availability, quality and conditions - is a major determinant of
psychic and somatic health. Health in turn is a prominent social good that
tends to be unequally distributed in the population in function of its accessi-
bility and the conditions of its social production. Its evolution depends,
among other things, on the evolution of work. This sketch starts with a short
recall of some aspects of our socio-economic system's meso- and macro-
history, distinguishes three models of macro-economic organization that
coexist unequally in present-day industrialized countries, and finally zooms
in on some aspects of work organization and worker qualification. Although
it focuses on work and some of its economic conditions, its approach will be
mainly sociological.
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Economic expansionism and counter-
tendencies
The actual world-wide economic system developed in
Europe over several centuries, in fact since the end of
the Middle Ages (Braudel 1973, Wallerstein 1974, 1980,
1989). It has come to place profit-seeking at the core of
its functioning - profit-seeking being here defined in
rather narrow monetary terms - and engenders an ever
increasing exploitation of any resources that prove to be
instrumental in that perspective. The notion of re-
sources or productive factors has long been defined in
too restricted a sense, meaning mainly natural re-
sources, work and capital. Looking at what is really
going on in economic development, we realize that na-
ture and culture in the broadest sense are part of the
resources progressively put to use and exploited by the
economy. Seen that way, the actual ecological problems
prove to be a direct consequence of the working of a
narrow, but expansive principle of economic rationality.
The Bible can be cited to justify a dominating and
exploiting relationship between man and nature just as
Marxist and other conceptions - it is part of the basic
assumptions of our occidental culture.
To consider nature as an economic resource has little
to astonish, even if we have been accustomed for quite a
long time to look at it - excuse the image - as a baby
looks to mother: you take everything you get, without
even thinking about where it comes from or about giv-
ing back something in exchange.
To consider culture as a resource to be exploited for
economic goals is a more recent conception, not only in
* Part of this paper is based on a collective "think project" on
the future of work in Switzerland (Bierter et al. 1988).
recent managerial doctrines about the culture of the
firm, but in the more general sense of exploiting work-
ers' skills and motivation - not only their "working
force". Lutz (1989), a German sociologist, has shown
that from the outset of industrialization, our economy
has been living on a motivational resource that it does
little, if anything, to reproduce. This resource is not
natural as most others, but cultural. It is the work ethics
that developed in pre-industrial periods and was well
attuned to pre-industrial modes of production. Since the
very beginning of industrialization, the modern facto-
ries have been recruiting their labour force largely from
the traditional sector, i.e. from the world of small
farms, craft workshops, commerce and other traditional
services. It is traditional in the sense that it corresponds
to what we may call, according to some anthropologists,
the domestic mode of production (Sahlins 1972, Medick
1977). Its guiding principle is not to produce and sell as
much as possible with as little cost as possible, but to
satisfy in an optimum way the basic needs of the house-
hold and its members (working harder in hard times,
and less in good times). This traditional sector relies on
a generalistic qualification of the economic actors, espe-
cially of the small independent ones, that is executed in
combination with a degree of autonomy and responsib-
ility much larger than what is usual for most workers' or
employee's jobs in modern factories or administrations.
Such capacities are not just handed down by tradition,
hear-say and explicit teaching; their practical exercise is
probably even more important for effective learning.
We can say that during the process of industrialization
(and in some countries until very recently), the modern-
izing economy eliminated the very traditional structures
whose motivational outcomes it used extensively.
The submission of an increasing part of social life
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under the needs of the economy can be seen as part of
this economy becoming increasingly disembedded (Po-
lanyi 1944). i.e. released from the social constraints
existing in traditional societies. Wallerstein (1974) pro-
poses to see in Charles the Great's failure to establish a
European Empire the historical explanation of capital-
ism developing in Europe, but in no other great feudal
system. According to this author, only in Europe a large
scale economic tissue developed that was not co-exten-
sive with an equally wide-ranging polity.
So in a way our market economy tends to have the
same relationship to nature and to culture (or motiva-
tion): it exploits them as if they where resources that
need no special effort to be reproduced. In fact most
propositions aimed at diminishing some of the present
ecological destruction have in common the idea to at
least begin to internalize into the economic system the
heretofore neglected function of reproducing the re-
sources on which it lives (e.g., introduce ecological and
social accounting and corresponding charges).
Models of production
The economic development of Western societies during
the 20th century has been closely related to a specific
form of production. It is not sufficiently well identified
by the general label of capitalism. Moreover, it is not
only made up of Taylorism and its subsequent, more
humanized versions, but of what some economic histori-
ans call Fordism, i.e., the profitable combination of
large-scale -production with high-wage politics assuring
mass consumption. We can call it a factual Keynesian-
ism (steering the business cycle mainly by influencing
the demand-side of the economic process through in-
come policies and state purchases); it can be state-
administered, private or mixed (Piore & Sabel 1984,
Coombs 1989).
Taylorism or 'Scientific Management' designs a tech-
nique of breaking down, on the basis of systematic
observation and testing, complex production processes
into small bits of action needing no specific qualification
and allowing for large scale standardized mass produc-
tion. It has been developed by the American engineer
Frederick R. Taylor at the beginning of the 20th century
and had quickly been given an additional impetus by its
combination with the mechanized production chain
There are a number of indicators pointing to the
possibility that the Fordist model is presently attaining
some internal limits to its further growth, and that it is
producing negative side-effects that may contribute to
its discredit. Let me first refer to the growing difficulties
to motivate workers sufficiently, that happen at the very
moment when the technologies applied make firms
more dependent on such motivation than before. High
fluctuation rates despite considerable extrinsic incen-
tives (wages, individualized time arrangements, various
material and organizational advantages offered by the
firm), absenteeism of persons absent and present, high
rates of errors and reparations needed before the prod-
uct leaves the factory often speak a clear language. Very
similar symptoms exist in the service sector.
Another internal limit to the continuation of Fordism
is the increasing instability due to large scale integration
of economic processes, of which the multinationaliza-
tion of large corporations is only the most visible form.
To the extent that there is close interdependence of
subunits within a highly integrated system (be it a firm,
an economic sector, a nation or even the economy on a
world scale), any local turbulence will have excellent
chances to spread to the other regions by systemic trans-
fer (Perrow 1984). Booms as well as crises are thus
blown up to the largest level, as the 1987 stock exchange
crash has demonstrated. (In this particularly rapid case
of a self-reinforcing escalation the systemic effects have
been essentially supported by automatic, computerized
portfolio management.)
A third indication of internal limits may be seen in the
increasing resistance, opposed mainly by business and
by conservative politicians against Keynesianism, the
welfare state and state intervention in general.
There are several attempts at overcoming the limits to
further Fordist production: work reorganization in or-
der to increase intrinsic motivation; hierarchy reduction;
the reorganization of the relationships between subunits
in order to create decentralized instead of centralized
integration; and the insertion of buffer functions against
the above-mentioned systemic effects of turbulence
propagation. Nevertheless, debate on such experiments
by far outweighs real experiences (for working exam-
ples on a regional scale see again Piore & Sabel 1984),
so I think that we are only at the beginning of a period
of practical exploration. For the time being, only few
large corporations seem to be inclined to try such exper-
iments. The sector of small and medium sized firms is
even more reluctant.
Reproduction of nature, reproduction of culture, the
internal limits to the Fordist model and the attempts to
overcome them will be among the main parameters
shaping the questions of interest. We may be faced with
the problems they create at a faster or slower pace and
in a different order than some have predicted. The
reasons for believing in the possibility of delay lie in the
present attempts and opportunities to overcome or ex-
tend the limits to Fordism. Especially and first, despite
some phenomena of over-production, market expansion
will be still further developed, both internally and ex-
ternally. External expansion refers to the development
of new markets - we are just at the beginning of the
opening up of eastern Europe to the market economy, a
bargain for putting to use the productive and investive
overkill of the western economic apparatus; the yet
unconquered immensity of China looms behind, and
also other developing parts of the Third World. Internal
expansion refers to the integration of still other func-
tions and services, up to now produced and exchanged
7 European Journal of Public Health 97
R. Levy
in non-market relationships, into the monetarized com-
modity circuit. This alters the conditions under which
people can have access to them and the social relation-
ships into which they are traditionally embedded. I am
thinking especially of all kinds of body and soul caring
(think of all sorts of individual and group therapy, sensi-
tivity training etc.), but include also leisure, the acquisi-
tion of knowledge and skills, and many kinds of coun-
selling. We have probably not yet reached the point of
maximal care-taking by professionals against money -
for those who can afford it, of course. Habermas (1981)
has called this process the colonization of everyday life.
Another strategy of expansion is speeding up the con-
sumption cycle. As its economic importance and unde-
sirable side effects (especially in ecological terms) are
probably underestimated, it must at least be mentioned.
This refers to the artificial shortening of the product life
cycle by planned obsolescence of hardware, software
and symbolic status. (The latter goes largely unob-
served, but is of great importance. We can call this
"fashion" in the largest sense of the term, with respect
to consumer goods, but also in other market sectors.
One of the more recent examples is the rapid succession
of improved versions of computer software, creating the
need for more hardware capacity, which facilitates the
use of still better programs, which run better on the
more recent computer model, for which even more
potent software exists, etc.)
Beside expansion, a second strategy to maintain eco-
nomic dynamics without questioning its basic model is
automation, today mainly based on computers, robots
and telecommunication. This strategy aims directly at
replacing human work by machine work in order to
diminish costs. There are still more strategies that may
permit firms to diminish their costs: dualizing the labour
force into a stable and a precarious segment, the latter
working under bad conditions in function of short-term
economic fluctuations; the transfer of labour intensive
operations to low-wage countries, and the delegation of
high-cost and low-profit production or service functions
to the clients. We can already observe a (little studied)
rise of consumption work, e.g., with telebanking and
pay-cards, that transfers the costly function of data en-
try onto the clients. In a similar vein, you may also think
of the mushrooming sector of do-it-yourself. Some anal-
ysts speak of the Black-and-Decker or Ikea syndrome to
design the double aspect of an expanding and profitable
market and a new category of private activity. We still
think of ourselves as customers buying goods and ser-
vices, but we are already on the way to become con-
sumption workers.
This means that the actual phase of economic devel-
opment has contradictory effects: on the one hand,
market forces and their logic continue to subdue further
territories and functional sectors that have so far re-
mained external to them, but on the other hand they
create a fringe of non-market activities (so-called grey
markets or informal economic activities, often on the
basis of moneyless barter and of course without taxes or
social insurance payments) that are linked to their func-
tioning, but escape legal regulation and institutional
control. This may turn out to be a surprising, unin-
tentional contribution to the realm of informal and al-
ternative economic activity, a realm that is otherwise
fuelled by ideological commitment (or by unlawful prac-
tices). Increasing commodification is thus accompanied
to some extent by increasing de-institutionalization and
demonetarization. This tendency expresses above all a
rationalizing strategy by profit-seeking firms, but also a
growing popular desire to reappropriate functions of
social life, actually taken care of by market processes,
institutional regulations and their inherent constraints.
This is a counter-tendency to the increasing colonization
of everyday life as diagnosed by Habermas (1981).
Owing to this situation, we are heading toward a
period of increasing diversity rather than of a unifying
master-trend, diversity of all aspects of economic life,
especially of the underlying models of production.
Which models? We may say that today the Fordist
model is predominant, be it on the factual level or only
as an aspiration: large-scale integrated mass production
for wage-encouraged mass consumption. At the other
extreme, we have a small, but interesting minority prac-
ticing "alternative production", giving as much or even
more importance to workers' self-determination and to
ecological compatibility than to productivity and wages.
While the Fordist model has been, at least in economic
terms, extremely successful during this century, the al-
ternative model has had enormous difficulties to get
stabilized in the long run under acceptable conditions. It
subsists on the margin of industrialized countries and
enjoys little expansion if any. There is still another,
third model, sometimes blending in with the second: the
traditional model of the small firm, owned and directed
by an independent craftsman, merchant or professional
who is often integrated, economically and socially, into
the local or regional networks. All three models will
continue to exist, but there will be other ones tried out
as well. Needless to say that problems of work orga-
nization heavily depend on these models. (Let us think
of just one example: just-in-time production. How
would its generalization affect work organization and
worker lives? It would most probably impose much
more flexibility in work schedules, with ensuing prob-
lems for the synchronization of various social rhythms,
e.g., of school life, associational and political life, con-
sumption and leisure.) However, this diversity will be
rather qualitative than quantitative, as there are pres-
ently no effective forces running against the on-going
globalization of the dominant model of production.
Social structure
Even if the overall trend of industrial and post-indus-
trial development is correlated to (and facilitated by)
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progressive reduction of social constraints on the econo-
my, it still takes place in the framework of human
societies; the men and women who work in it do also
participate in the life of other social sectors. So let us
briefly and very sketchily look at social change outside
the economy, especially at social stratification in highly
developed countries. Sociologists define stratification as
the system of social inequalities within a society. Recent
research and interpretations seem to converge on one
overall tendency: in modern, especially highly industri-
alized or even post-industrialized societies, the main
social inequalities do not diminish, but they become
more independent of each other. In sociological jargon
one would say that the crystallization of the stratifica-
tion system diminishes, which means that social bound-
aries become bluired, that classes become less identi-
fiable. In other words: according to the different criteria
that constitute the stratification system, e.g., income,
formal education, occupational position, people contin-
ue to be located at very different levels, but one and the
same person may be differently positioned according to
the criterion considered.
What are the likely consequences of de-crystalliza-
tion? The main consequence is increasing individual-
ization, mainly not on an ideological, but on a social-
structural basis, i.e. it concerns the social order itself
and not social representations in the first place (Beck
1986). As people are differently integrated in society
and its substructures, they make social experiences that
singularize them; they will find it increasingly difficult to
recognize themselves in the experiences made by
others; thinking in individual rather than collective
terms will become increasingly plausible. Social struc-
ture becomes invisible; society becomes less transparent
and less real to its members. Its global outline disappears
behind the multiplicity of its constituent elements, and a
crucial basis for solidarity gets decomposed.
Another consequence of structural individualization
is probably the value change that has set in since the
beginning of the 70s. Several studies show a shift from
materialist to post-materialist values, giving less priority
to issues of material well-being and security and more to
themes like self-realization, sociability, spirituality (In-
glehart 1971, 1990).
Structural and cultural individualization have to be
taken into account - not only in politics, but also in
economic strategies that aim at overcoming the obsta-
cles to further expansion of the fordist model. New
technologies play a critical role in such strategies; we
shall presently have a closer look at their social mean-
ing.
A second major trend, likely to be reinforced by the
first one, is the growing gap between everyday life, with
its social ties, non-commercial exchanges, individual ac-
tivities and reflexions, and the institutions forming the
macrostructure of society. The search for autonomy, put
forward by the protagonists of the students' and other
new social movements in the last 20 years, becomes
structurally based and transforms into a largely shared
social aspiration. The large institutional structures (like
the state, firms, the army, the church) do not simply
disappear, but their capacity to organize large parts of
people's everyday lives diminishes and their social legit-
imacy may be challenged. (By legitimacy we mean the
social acceptation of a hierarchy, of an unequal distribu-
tion of a valued good such as income, of a powerful
social actor by those who find themselves in a weak
position.) We may even speculate that if this gap is to
grow to a substantial degree, it might become a major
social tension and lead to important institutional rear-
rangements. The changes under way in the east, but
also to some extent the construction of a more inte-
grated Europe are of that kind.
New technologies and work organization
The new technologies, especially the information tech-
nologies, are basically ambivalent (Coriat 1990). They
may be introduced into existing structures according to
an exclusively technocratic logic (T), or their introduc-
tion can be the occasion of reorganization (S+T).
In the first case, the T-strategy, they are likely to
continue and reinforce the inherent negative tendencies
of the Taylorist or post-Taylorist work organization.
They will contribute, among others, to the exclusion of
humane work (and often of human work altogether)
from the workshop and the office and will do little to
avoid the limits of the Fordist model in the long run.
The T-strategy of technology introduction is bound to
deepen the polarization between physical and mental
work, and probably often also the one between the
category of highly and intrinsically motivated stable
workers on the one hand and the one of poorly, extrinsi-
cally motivated "marginal" workers on the other. All of
these consequences are bound to negatively affect not
only the quality of life at work, but also productivity.
In the second case, the S+T-strategy, the new tech-
nologies can support new modes of organization, more
flexible, decentralized and less hierarchic, that focus on
self-organization, qualification and responsibility, allow
for more flexibility of the firm as a whole and maybe
even for the construction of regional networks that can
become alternatives to world-wide-integrated firms
(Piore & Sabel 1984).
To realize this second possibility calls for the socio-
technical systems approach (Herbst 1974, Ulich et al.
1989). This approach considers the technical and the
social subsystem of a work organization as two parts to
be integrated with each other. They cannot be opti-
mized alone, but only together, one-sidedness in one or
the other direction creating disturbances in the func-
tioning of the whole.
The choice between the T-strategy and the S+T-strat-
egy is fundamental for the quality of life at work. Which
choice is finally made seems rarely predetermined by
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technical constraints. // depends largely on how the main
actors confront the issues of work and firm organization.
The choice is basically not of a technical, but of a
political kind. Actually, an increasing number of firms is
taking into account what is referred to rather prudishly
as the human factor; I think that due to the problems
inherent to the Fordist model, this concern is bound to
stay with us ever more seriously.
A master concept coming along with these technol-
ogies is flexibility. Temporal and spatial flexibility of
work are as ambivalent as the more structural or orga-
nizational aspects I have already pointed to; it can be
just another instrument of increasing productivity at the
expense of workers, or it can be a management philoso-
phy integrating their aspirations into the goals of the
firm.
Flexible time may concern different aspects and orga-
nizational levels: the distribution of the global volume
of work on all the persons seeking employment (de-
crease of individual work time proportional to increases
in productivity and to mechanization of tasks), but also
its variable distribution over the personal life cycle, the
year, the week according to various formulae. Favoured
by telecommunications and the compacting of various
work equipments, flexible place might concern an in-
creasing number of people, far beyond of those occupa-
tions that have traditionally been working on varying
sites.
Flexible time is increasingly experimented, but some
forms are much more popular than other ones. One
important dividing line seems to be whether the formula
responds only to the employer's interests or also to
those of the employees. Flexible place is rarely prac-
ticed; many firms who do have the choice refrain from
giving out pieces and information, e.g., to so-called
satellite offices, ostensibly fearing a loss of control (Ol-
son 1989).
Still another form of flexibility concerns the technical
system used: flexible production. These systems - in
production as in the services, e.g., travel organization)-
tend to become increasingly multi-functional and
geared toward just-in-time treatment of incoming or-
ders, which means to combine the technical and eco-
nomical advantages of mass production with the height-
ened value of a-la-carte products. Providing a high level
of qualification of their collaborators, this possibility
could be a bargain for small and medium-sized firms as
it helps to bring down production costs while maintain-
ing an individualized service to the customer (Ulich et
al. 1989).
The first option - enhancing productivity by purely
technological measures - can be successful in the short
range, postponing its negative side-effects. In the mid-
dle and long range, the second option is likely to prove
economically superior. The problem is that manage-
ment action seems to be mainly and increasingly con-
ceived in the short range only.
Qualification of the work-force
At the risk of repeating well-known things, it is in place
here to take up some considerations about qualification
demands of working men and women as a function of
the new technologies, especially if their introduction is
not accompanied by changes of the organization and the
overall conception of work. This will allow us to see on
a more practical level the differences between a purely
technical and an integrated socio-technic strategy of
work reorganization:
Work is becoming more abstract. Direct manipulation
of physical objects is being replaced by manipulation of
symbols and informations; the worker becomes a steer-
ing agent of complex machines. This results in a very
different mobilization of human capacities than was the
case by traditional forms of work. This concerns again
production as well as a large segment of the services,
where part of direct relational work with clients is being
rationalized, i.e. transferred to machines. For instance,
face-to-face activities, traditionally linked to informa-
tion exchange of all kind are replaced by multiplier
activities, permitting a single employee, civil servant,
counselling agent, etc., to respond to a higher number
of recipients whom he or she no longer meets, but
contacts by way of intervening technical media. In the
same vein, information entry is increasingly no longer
performed in direct interaction, but by the clients' tech-
nical manipulation (card-paying etc.). To the extent to
which this change takes place, persons with a more
traditional profile of capacities (manual or social skills)
will find more difficulties to get interesting jobs and risk
decreasing quality of life at work. This kind of problem
is likely to fall especially on women as their relational
skills may find fewer fields of professional utility. This
tendency could be countered by the heightened atten-
tion some firms begin to pay to their interface with
customers, seeking to come back from mass marketing
to personalized contacts.
The systems, especially the software used by the new
technologies change rapidly, their longevity is brought
down to very short intervals. This accelerated rhythm of
change entails the necessity of frequent adaptations of
the know-how and skills involved in handling these sys-
tems. Mastering the work instrument is less and less a
definitively acquired asset, reorientation becomes an
important capacity in itself, both for the workers and for
the management. Recurrent education, the necessary
capacities and motivation become a compulsory prereq-
uisite for staying on the job. Cognitive flexibility be-
comes a major plus. However, there may be some exag-
geration as to the diminished value presently attributed
to personal experience, part of which probably remains
a precious cultural capital for those firms that succeed in
putting it to use.
The new systems are of an increasingly flexible appli-
cation. Their handling demands cognitive functioning
on higher levels of abstraction than is the case of more
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traditional work skills. Professional excellence will con-
cern more the mastery of instrumental information than
the virtuosity of execution. The comments to my first
point are applicable again.
The flexibility and multi-functionality of the technical
svstem is based on a transfer of technical knowledge from
the workers to the machines, a trend particularly con-
spicuous in the case of expert systems. Eventually, due
to such systems, professional functions or even entire
professions may become obsolete, even those taken
until recently to be un-rationalizable, especially those
implying the mastering of large sets of factual informa-
tion (take medical diagnosis or the profession of phar-
macist). Among the consequences of the diffusion of
such innovations there could be considerable conflict
involving vested interests, especially if traditionally
privileged professions are concerned. More generally,
this may become a major factor of dehumanizing the
work place with all the ensuing problems for the firm
and the larger social community. The alternative would
be a fundamental reorientation toward more integrated,
holistic forms of work organization
Computerized data processing allows to dissociate the
functions of execution and control much more than pre-
vious technologies. On purely technical grounds, decen-
tralized work (individual work stations that may be
located at very distant places) can easily be combined
with centralized control. Thus it is possible to increase
the social control of individual workers while diminish-
ing their capacity to organize and to develop collective
action. After a prolonged period of relative stability,
this may become one element of a basic challenge to the
actual state of industrial relations. At the time being, its
impact is attenuated by the resistances against the most
pronounced forms of telework. Moreover, it is by no
means evident that isolated workers work better than
teams.
While diminishing the risks of physical harm by work
accidents, the introduction of new technologies engen-
ders further intensification of work, often also social
isolation and uneven demands on human skills. Apart
from (and parallel to) the problems related to shift
work, there is a real risk that instead of eliminating the
negative effects of work (such as specific morbidity and
mortality), these technologies transfer disturbances
from the purely somatic to the psychosomatic and psy-
chosocial level. Such problems are more diffuse, less
evident to identify, less easily attributable to their ori-
gin, and more difficult to treat.
This list is certainly incomplete, but let me stop here.
It may seem unilateral as it features the negative conse-
quences of introducing new technologies and especially
of their introducing according to a one-sidedly technical
conception. This is not the result of ideological partisan-
ship, but of a rather sceptical look at the forces behind
the actual processes of technological diffusion. Most of
these technologies are capital-devouring and serve to
save manpower costs, which means that management
puts them to use primarily to rapidly achieve high pro-
ductivity with low labour cost and quick redemption of
the invested capital, and only secondarily (if at all) to
reorganize and humanize work. This one-sided logic is
likely to prevail as long as labour unions do not effec-
tively interfere with it, and as long as its negative eco-
nomic side-effects will not be clearly singled out by
current accounting procedures.
Value change and work
We should look into still another element of change that
has already been mentioned: the change of values,
mainly among the younger generations (Inglehart
1971). This change is generally analyzed as a shift from
materialist to post-materialist values, giving less priority
to issues of material well-being and security and more to
themes like self-realization, sociability and spirituality.
Such a change seems really to take place, but it would
certainly be wrong to think of it in terms of a general
and progressive decline of the materialist values. It is a
change of priorities.
Among the so-called materialist values we also find
work. What is being questioned is not so much work as
a social value but the formalist (bourgeois, Protestant,
materialist...) conception valuing work in itself, what-
ever its content. The value change implies not a general
decrease of the interest in work, but a more demanding
attitude that could be expressed by the phrase: either I
get interesting work, then I'm prepared to identify with
it, or I just get a well-paying job, then don't ask me for
any personal commitment.
There are, however, good reasons to believe that
such a value change will hardly spill over some very
basic barriers inherent in the social order. These are set
by the way exchange is institutionalized in our societies.
The main institutional form of exchange is the market
mechanism. It makes it impossible for most people to
survive physically and socially without buying goods and
services with money they must earn by working. It is not
before this structural link will be weakened that such a
value change can be expected to motivate behavioural
change on a significant scale, unless the power balance
on the labour market moves enough in favour of the
employees to permit them to be qualitatively selective.
The guaranteed basic income would be a mechanism
that could break the structural link giving its central role
to work in present societies (Schmid 1984, GRAEL
1986).
An intriguing thing about this value change is that it
seems to be rather closely correlated with economic
development: it has gone farthest in the richest coun-
tries and is weakest in the poor countries (Inglehart
1979). This suggests that the questioning of materialist
values may be directly linked to a high level of their
realization (or of their perceived realizability). In sim-
pler terms: as long as a population does not enjoy a fair
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level of material well-being, its achievement remains an
unquestioned priority. Only when you are sure you can
get what you consider important, you start looking out
for something else that you would like to get as well.
The rise of post-materialist values being tied to interna-
tional inequality indicates that this case of value-sub-
stitution must be seen as a luxury by countries and
populations who are struggling for material well-being
on a substantially lower level. We should, in this re-
spect, not only think of Third World countries, but also
of those of the Second, i.e. the eastern World. Most of
them are under way to fully integrate themselves into
the international system built around the social value of
socio-economic development, in other terms around the
very materialist values that start being challenged in
those countries that are most privileged in respect to
them. In this international perspective, one could ask
whether the quality-of-Iife debate in the rich countries
of the globe has not a subterranean dimension of neo-
feudalism supporting it. That value change, if it be-
comes effective on a societal level, adds a new criterion
to the bundle of international inequalities, concerning
which it is still more difficult to move upward than with
respect to the other ones.
In the rich countries, there may be another, structural
force that undermines the centrality of work as a social
value. I am thinking of the enormous effort at sub-
stituting human labour by automated machine work,
especially in the form of computer integrated manu-
facturing (CIM). The dream of the unmanned factory
appears to many as a promising strategy to get rid of
rising wage costs, human errors, the unpredictable la-
bour market and unruly labour unions. Practical exam-
ples are being tested. For some reasons, it can be
doubted whether this concept will really prove to be
economically rational. But however this question may
be answered, such a perspective is a novel challenge to
our valuing work as a basic human capacity and activity.
Christian, liberal-economic and Marxist conceptions all
share the conviction that work has an essential anthro-
pological significance. Current studies on unemploy-
ment support this view.1 If economic values can be
produced without human work, the social value of work
risks to be shattered fatally, as it no longer appears to be
a necessary condition of life.
The technical possibility of human work becoming
largely superfluous can be seen as a promise of hell or of
paradise - whatever it be, it leads to rather basic ques-
tions:
- Is it still sensible to think that values, especially eco-
nomical ones, can only be created by human work?
- Is it actually true that we are significant beings mainly
by virtue of our economic activity?
- If ever we get at a point where large parts of the
economy no longer need human labour - what will
then guarantee the sheer existence of human beings?
- If a post-work society becomes thinkable, should we
also start to figure out around what values and struc-
tures such a society might be organized?
Once we start examining these questions, some quite
fundamental elements of our social order begin to re-
quire rethinking. But for the time being, it is only the
small, privileged part of the world's northwest that is
concerned by such considerations, so we should briefly
come back go a more global perspective.
A look at the international system
While many promising social experiments are being
tried out on a local scale, especially in the countries of
northern Europe and North America, the economy has
become global. Multinational corporations (MNCs) are
now a major element of the international social struc-
ture. Between half and three quarters of all interna-
tional exchanges are estimated to have by now become
intra-corporation exchanges (Beaud 1987), allowing,
among others, for hidden, large scale capital transfers
difficult to control by national agencies. MNCs are pow-
erful collective actors, organizing a large and increasing
part of the available work places all over the world.
Compared to polities, their action is subject to consid-
erably fewer constraints: they are much less bound to a
particular territory, can easily navigate among national
contexts and their specific political and legal con-
straints, and are often weighty negotiators, especially
when faced by governments of economically and politi-
cally weak regions or countries.
The rise of MNCs as powerful economic actors on a
global level takes place in a period of stagnating in-
tergovernmental structures. It thus appears to be still
another step in the above-mentioned process of the
economy's social dis-embedding (Polanyi 1944). While
1
 See, among many others, Jahoda (1982) and Levi (1987).
However, there are some intriguing exceptions such as those
reported in Zoll (1987) or those concerning collective unem-
ployment reported by Osterland (1990). They raise the ques-
tion of how we should define work. Instead of doing it, as
usual, above all in an essentialist way, i.e. referring to its
intrinsic characteristics, we could consider more important that
it is a regular human activity taking place in and being shaped by
a specific substructure of society, Us economic sector, and in the
framework of this sector's specific social relations. Its objec-
tively existential relevance - various subjective reinterpreta-
tions notwithstanding - may result not so much from the cul-
tural meaning attached to it than from the work—»income-
—»survival link which is a central institutional feature of market
economy societies. We know little about how unemployment,
i.e. the absence of work for income, is subjectively experienced
if this institutional link is weakened or altogether absent on a
societal level - except for children, housewifes and retired
persons. These are categories that are socially defined (not
existentially and even less genetically "programmed") as not
having to engage in the work force. Frequently, the persons
belonging to these categories (at least those living in the first
and second situation) do not seem particularly de-personalized
- work is legitimately absent from their role set, the mentioned
institutional link is not relevant to them...
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even middle and small firms start to go international,
polities remain national. Even if the global stalemate
between the superpowers has become fluid with the
disintegration of the Soviet system, no functional equiv-
alent of a government with regulated input and output
structures and implementation power is taking shape on
the international level (even if the intervening capacity
of the UNO has increased somewhat). Polities and firms
may have common features. There is at least one impor-
tant difference that is of interest: polities, at least demo-
cratic ones, provide more regularly for political input
and some form of democratic control of their function-
ing and priorities than firms. Even if the latter have to
respond to the market, they are hardly ever faced with
an organized opponent that would act as for instance
political parties or interest groups do. This difference
applies not only to the material or symbolic goods they
sell, but also to the working conditions they offer. Up to
now, attempts at developing international labour unions
that would become effective counterparts to the MNCs
have had only limited success. Moreover, the implanta-
tion of MNC branches in Third World countries has
several disruptive effects on national economies, social
conditions and inequality: they create a ghettoized la-
bour aristocracy, dependent subcontractors, contribute
little or (in the long run) negatively to general devel-
opment (Bornschier & Chase-Dunn 1985), have nega-
tive effects on the physical well-being of the larger pop-
ulation (Wimberley 1990) and reinforce the margin-
alization of the traditional economic sector and the
population that is related to it - needless to remind that
this sector is a much more important part of Third
World than of European or North American societies,
and that its often neglected contribution to national
subsistence is crucial to their societies' development.
The social value of material well-being (to which
health in its elementary and more elaborate forms be-
longs as well) is central to the international inequalities
of development and also to the popular aspirations all
over the world. We have seen that the value-change in
favour of non-materialist values is by far most pro-
nounced in the (economically) richest countries of the
world. We may consider these international inequalities
as a proper stratification system, with nations stratified
into classes or rather into structurally defined hierarchi-
cal layers. Low-status populations of low-ranking coun-
tries can choose between (or combine) two alternative
interpretations of their situation: international discrimi-
nation of their society as a whole, or internal (class)
discrimination (Heintz 1982). Low-status populations of
high-ranking countries may feel little solidarity with the
former, since active solidarity implies some form of
international redistribution and must appear to threaten
their own well-being (which they rarely see as a privi-
lege as their social reference is not with their structural
peers in poorer societies, but with the privileged groups
in their own societies).
Up to now, the international system, organized
around the value of development under conditions of
capitalist or market economies, functioned in parallel to
a smaller, mostly self-contained international system of
socialist economies, equally stratified on the level of
nations, but officially built around values of solidarity
and equality rather than of increasing well-being. How-
ever, the latter was not denied, on the contrary. Ever
since Stalin the official doctrine of the Eastern world
has engaged in an explicitly declared competition for
well-being and national economic force with the capital-
ist West, thus implanting the very criterion for these
regimes' increasing and eventually exploding illegiti-
macy. The Soviet international system had little interac-
tion with the the capitalist system. For good or bad
reasons, the legitimacy of the Soviet systems' internal
structures has very quickly faded away, and most of its
nation states are striving to integrate into the first sys-
tem (where they will at best occupy intermediate ranks,
comparable to Latin American or Southern European
countries). On the structural level, the first-mentioned
international system, characterized by few and weak
overarching political structures and much leeway for
MNCs and other forms of economic power, will thus
become even more predominant. On the cultural level,
the socialist project of an alternative social organization
is now heavily discredited - again irrespective of this
being so for good or for bad reasons.
It is not possible at this time to explore in detail
hypotheses about the likely consequences of this pro-
cess of system homogenization on a global scale. Never-
theless, our brief considerations suggest some argu-
ments to fear that at least for some time there will be an
increased acceptance of individualistic and self-blaming
ways of responding to economic pressures in many parts
of the world - with the ensuing bad prospects for health-
furthering work reorganization.
What can science do?
We must recognize that health - work-related and other
- is a socially defined, produced and unequally distrib-
uted good. As such it is interlocked with other forms of
power and privilege, with their reproduction or trans-
formation. We must also recognize that the access any
individual has to this good does not only depend on his
or her personal effort and talent, but also (or even to a
larger extent) on the various social conditions under
which he or she has to act.
We have looked into some of the complexities of the
structural and cultural context, from the meso-social up
to the global level of the present world system. It is
obvious that such complex and multi-layered systems
cannot be reduced to simple determinisms and exclusive
two-variable relationships. They are made of multiple,
interrelated, vicious and virtuous circles of interdepend-
ence. As a consequence, no either/or kind of strategy
can be likely to produce desired change, but only multi-
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level interventions based on global and complex think-
ing, even if action has to be local.
As scientists, we have easier access to factual and
interpretive knowledge and to the possibilities of their
diffusion than to the power that is needed to directly
change social structures. Information can be a source of
power and thus become a social structure. But it is more
prone to directly affect legitimacy, and power only in-
directly; the countries of eastern Europe have given a
striking example of the regime-shaking effectiveness a
fast loss of legitimacy can have. We may hypothesize
that scientific information can effect desired (or prevent
undesired) change in social structures if it
- reinforces the legitimacy of actors who have a real
interest to go in the desired direction,
- reduces the legitimacy of actors who pursue adverse
interests (i.e. their legitimacy among their constitu-
ency, clients or other relevant partners),
- can open up or structure new situations that are not
yet institutionalized and where the relevant actors
have not yet clearly defined their central issues and
interests.
A general strategical principle could then be to pursue
activity that
- aims at changes in institutional functioning,
- counters ideologies presenting the status quo as being
natural, necessary or individually and not socially
constructed, and
- encourages forms of self-help, giving support to au-
tonomous organization and action, e.g., by giving
privileged access to operational information etc.,
- constructs the necessary informal networks and other
instruments for information exchange that support
such activities.
The area of autonomous organization, non-dependent
on centers of power, might be an area that can develop
at a time in the international north and south, and it
may be a less conflicting field of intervention for scien-
tists than highly institutionalized contexts with their
vested resistances against change.
Bibliography
Beaud M (1987). Le systeme national/mondial hierarchise.
Une nouvelle lecture du capitalisme mondial. Paris: Edi-
tions la d^couverte.
Beck U (1986). Risikogesellschaft. Auf dem Weg in eine an-
dere Modeme. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. (Engl. risk society.
Towards a New Modernity. Sage 1992).
Bierter W et al. (1988). (K)eine Zukunft fur lebendige Arbeit?
Ein Szenario. Reihe Arbeitswelt. Zurich: Verlag der Fach-
vereine.
Bornschier V, Chase-Dunn C (1985). Transnational Corpora-
tions and Underdevelopment. New York: Praeger.
Braudel F (1973). Capitalism and Material Life 1400-1800.
New York: Harper & Row.
Coombs R, Jones B (1989). Alternative Successors to Fordism.
In: Jaeger C & Ernste H (eds). Information Society and
Spatial Structure. London/ New York: Belhaven Press:
107-16.
Coriat B (1990). L'atelier et le robot. Paris: Bourgois.
GRAEL (l986). The guaranteed basic income and the future
of Social Security. Brussels: Green-Alternative European
Link, Rainbowgroup, European Parliament.
Habermas J (1981). Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns.
Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
Heintz P (1982). Images of World Society. Int Soc Sci J 34(1):
11-21.
Herbst PG (1974). Socio-technical Design Strategies in Multi-
disciplinary Research. London: Tavistock.
Inglehart R (1971). The Silent Revolution in Europe: Intergen-
erational Changes in Post-Industrial Societies. APSR 65:
991-1017.
Inglehart R (1979). Value Priorities and socioeconomic
Change (Chap. 11). Barnes SH & Kaase M (eds). Political
Action. Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies.
London: Sage.
Inglehart R (1990). Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial So-
ciety, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Jahoda M (1982). Employment and Unemployment. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press.
Levi L (ed, 1987). Unemployment and Health. Soc. Sci. Med
25(2), Special Issue.
Lutz B (1989 (1984)). Der kurze Traum immerwahrender Pros-
pentat. Eine Neuinterpretation der industriell-kapitalistis-
chen Entwicklung im Europa des 20. Jahrhunderts Reihe
Campus. Frankfurt/New York: Campus.
Medick H (1977). Die proto-industrielle Familienwirtschaft.
In: Kriedte P, Medick H & Schlumbohm J. Industnalisic-
rung vor der Industrialisierung. Gottingen: Vandenhoeck &
Ruprecht: 90-154.
Olson MH (1989). Telework: Effects of Changing Work Pat-
terns in Space and Time. In: Jaeger C & Ernste H (eds).
Information Society and Spatial Structure. London/New
York: Belhaven Press.
Osterland M (1990). Massenentlassung als kollektive Erfah-
rung. In: Dressel W et al. Lebenslauf, Arbeitsmarkt und
Sozialpolitik. Nurnberg: Institut fur Arbeitsmarkt- und Be-
rufsforschung der Bundesanstalt fur Arbeit: 139-50.
Perrow C (1984), Normal Accidents. Living with High-Risk
Technologies. New York: Basic Books.
Piore MJ & Sabel CF (1984). The Second Industrial Divide:
Possibilities for Prosperity. New York: Basic Books.
Polanyi K (1944). The Great Transformation. Boston: Beacon
Press.
Sahlins M (1972). Stone Age Economics. Chicago: Aldine.
Schmid T (ed, 1984). Befreiung von falscher Arbeit. Thesen
zum garantierten Mindesteinkommen. Berlin: Wagenbach.
Ulich E, Conrad-Betschart H & Baitsch C (1989). Arbeitsform
mit Zukunft: ganzheitlich-flexibel statt arbeitsteilig. Grund-
lagen und 7 Fallstudien aus der Maschinenindustrie. Bern/
Frankfurt/New York/Paris: Lang.
Wallerstein I (1974, 1980, 1989). The Modern World System, I
(Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European
World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century), II (Mercantilism
and the Consolidation of the European World-Economy,
1600-1750) and III (The Second Era of Great Expansion of
the Capitalist World-Economy, 1730-1840). New York:
Academic Press.
Wimberley DW (1990). Investment Dependence and Alterna-
tive Explanations of Third World Mortality: A Cross-Na-
tional Study. ASR 55(1): 75-91.
Zoll R (ed, 1987). "Nicht so wie unsere Eltern!" Hypothese
eines neuen kulturellen Modells. Bericht uber das sozial-
wissenschaftliche Forschungsprojekt Arbeitsorientierungen
von Jugendlichen. Universitat Bremen.
Received: 6 March 1991
Accepted: 21 April 1992
104
